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Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)' is a fear-provoking dis-
ease.2 If diagnosed today, an AIDS victim can anticipate an onslaught of opportun-
istic infections3 that continually assault the body.4 Additionally, the mind may often
be affected by progressive dementia' which can occur with or without other physical
manifestations.6 Death follows.7 The expected mortality rate8 for AIDS is one
hundred percent.9 Because of this, some members of the medical profession have
suggested a quick and painless means of death should be available as an alternative
to the lengthy and agonizing illness which is inevitable for AIDS victims.'0 "Dr.
Stephen Yarnell, a homosexual psychiatrist with AIDS, publicly argues that AIDS
victims should commit suicide.""
Anyone who has AIDS is a victim. If AIDS produces a victim then who is the
perpetrator? AIDS can be transmitted through intimate sexual contact, by sharing
contaminated needles, via infected blood or blood products, and through passage of
the virus from infected mothers to their newborns. 2 This comment will concentrate
'Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing For Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome--AIDS, 37 EMORY L.J. 217 (LEXIS 7) (Winter 1988). On August 1, 1985, the Center for Disease Control
in Atlanta promulgated a definition of the disease that had become known as the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome:
1) One or more of the opportunistic diseases... (diagnosed by methods considered reliable)
and are at least moderately indicative of underlying cellular immune deficiency, and
2) Absence of all the underlying causes of cellular immunodeficiency (other than HTLV-IlI-
LAV infection) and absence of all other causes of reduced resistance reported to be
associated with at least one of those opportunistic diseases.
'Cleary, Education and the Prevention of AIDS, 16:3-4 LAW, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 267, 270 (1988).
1 Comment, supra note 1, at LEXIs 3-4. Opportunistic Diseases: Terminal illnesses of AIDS victims.
Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia which is a rare and virulent pulmonary disease caused by a protozoan
parasite commonly found in the environment to which exposure to healthy individuals with normal immune
systems has no serious consequences and Kaposi's Sarcoma which is an unusually rare cancer of the small
blood vessels of the skin detected in young immunodeficient males but typically found in old men of Jewish
or Mediterranean-Italian descent. Id.
4 Harris, AIDS and the Future, 4:2 ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 141, 145 (1988).
5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387 (5th ed. 1979). Dementia: Form of mental disorder in which cognitive and
intellectual functions of the mind are prominently affected; impairment of memory is early sign; total
recovery not possible since organic cerebral disease is involved. Id.
6 Harris, supra note 4.
Weber, AIDS and Constitutional Issues, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 575, 583 (19880.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (5th ed. 1979). Mortality rate: The relative incidence of death. Id.
Weber, supra note 7.
10 Harris, supra note 4.
" Id.
12 Weber, supra note 7, at 588.
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on transmission through infected blood or blood products, and the blood donor. The
discussion will focus on the civil and criminal liabilities of a blood donor with the
AIDS virus.
However, to thoroughly understand the AIDS-infected blood donor issue and
subsequent liabilities, it is imperative to understand AIDS, the disease, as well as the
evolution of blood donation procedures in the United States since mid-1981.
PART I
AIDS, THE DISEASE
AIDS is the name given to a complex of health problems first reported in mid-
1981 to the Center for Disease Control.13 AIDS is a viral disease in which persons
afflicted suffer a loss of natural immunity against disease.'4 This leaves the AIDS
patient vulnerable to many more infections or malignancies, called opportunistic
diseases, that would not otherwise be a threat.'" These opportunistic diseases
eventually kill AIDS patients.' 6
Much of the body's immune system is located in the white blood cells, (i.e.
lymphocytes). 17 Lymphocytes are composed of T-cells and B-cells, the special
white blood cells which jointly produce the anti-body protein that identifies and
begins to destroy disease-causing organisms. 8 In the discovery of the first oppor-
tunistic diseases, pneumocystis crinii pneumonia' 9 and Kaposi's sarcoma,20 the con-
dition was characterized by a lack of the T-4 helper cells which are essential to
mounting proper immunological response.2' The victims of these diseases were
previously healthy individuals who developed the syndrome of infection with no
identifiable cause.2 2 One common trait of the victims was that they all were sexually
active homosexual males. 23 As the number of cases increased, other identified
populations "at risk" were: intravenous drug users, prostitutes, and hemophiliac
patients.2
4
'3 Weber, supra note 7, at 576.
14 Weber, supra note 7, at 577.
"5 Id. at 577 (citing Public Health Service, The Public Health Response to AIDS, 1985 AIDS INFORMATION
BULL (Nov.). Patients usually died within eighteen months of diagnosis. They suffered from a variety of
physical symptoms including persistent fever, diarrhea, night sweats, dry cough, and mental deterioration.
16 Weber, supra note 7, at 577.
'" Comment, supra note I, at LEXIs 6.
'
81d.
"9 See supra note 3.
20 Id.
2' Comment, supra note 1, at LExis 6.
22 Weber, supra note 7, at 578.
23 Id.
241 d. (citing Center for Disease Control, Up-date on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United
States, 31 MMWR 507 (1982).
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In 1983, researchers identified the causative agent of AIDS, a retrovirus,
which in May of 1986 became known as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)."
Once the HIV virus was discovered, researchers reported a range of effects of
the AIDS agent, from symptomless carriers (seropositive), to Aids-related complex
(ARC), to a severe life-threatening disease (AIDS).2 6 These three diseases are char-
acterized and identified dependent on gradations of clinical symptoms and disor-
ders.2 7
AIDS
The fatal phase of the disease is full-blown AIDS and is characterized by life-
threatening conditions.28 Opportunistic diseases and a positive test for HIV antibod-
ies form a diagnosis. 29 The life-expectancy of an AIDS victim is about one year and
90% of those.who contract AIDS die within two years.30 By December of 1987, there
were nearly 47,000 cases of AIDS reported to the Center for Disease Control in the
United States. 31 Ninety percent of the cases were in young adults between twenty and
forty-nine and the population encompassed all racial and ethnic groups.
32
AIDS-Related Complex (ARC)
ARC is a lesser form of AIDS; it is infectious, but not life threatening. 33 The
signs and symptoms include generalized enlarged lymph nodes, unintentional
weight loss, fever, chronic diarrhea, and immunologic abnormalities characteristic
of AIDS. 34 Individuals with ARC stand a significant chance of developing AIDS. 35
Over a period of two to four years, approximately one out of four ARC patients
develop full-blown AIDS.36 The general consensus is that all ARC patients will
eventually develop full-blown AIDS and die.37
25 Weber, supra note 7, at 580-81 (citing Center for Disease Control, Antibodies to a Retrovirus Etiologically
Associated with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Populations with Increased Incidence of the
Syndrome, 33 MMWR 377 (1984)). French researchers at the Pasteur Institute in Paris and at the National
Cancer Institute independently identified the causative agent in 1983 and 1984, respectively. The French
called it LAV and the Americans HTLV-III. The Executive Committee of the International Committee on
Taxonomy of Viruses recommended use of name HIV or human immunodeficiency virus to replace LAV
and HTLV-III.
26 Weber, supra note 7, at 582.
27 Id. at 583 (citing FDA Drug Bull. at 1 (Oct. 1985)).
2 8 Id.
I Weber, supra note 7, at 583.
31 Id. (citing Peterman, Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 11 WORLD J.
SURGERY 36 (Feb. 1987).
"' Weber, supra note 7, at 582. (Citing FDA Drug Bull., Oct. 1985 at 1).
32 Weber, supra note 7, at 584.
33 Id.
14 Comment, supra note 1, at LExIs 9-10.
11 Calabrese, A Guide For Living With the AIDS Virus, CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION 6 (1988).
3 6 
Id.
"Weber, supra note 7, at 585 (citing Weller, From Persistent Generalized Lymphadenopathy to AIDS: Who
Will Progress?, 294 BR. MED. J. 868 (1987)).
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Seropositive
The largest group of individuals infected with the virus are asymptomatic
carriers.38 Although these individuals carry a lifelong infection with the virus in the
blood stream, and other body fluids they appear totally healthy.39 Preliminary
studies indicate that up to ten percent of seropositive individuals may eventually
develop full-blown AIDS within two years of diagnosis.4" All seropositive individu-
als are capable of transmitting the disease. 4' Between one and two million people in
this country are seropositive, including almost one hundred percent of those with
full-blown AIDS and over ninety percent of those with ARC. There are three serious
implications of such prevalent seropositivity: (1) the virus may continue to destroy
the immune system of seropositive persons and evolve into full-blown AIDS; (2)
individuals are infectious and though asymptomatic, transmit HIV to others through
sexual contact or blood; and (3) because of the poor antibody production and the
mutating properties of the virus, prospects of an effective vaccine are poor.
4 2
Transmission
AIDS is not easily communicated. Transmission occurs through intimate
sexual contact (both heterosexual and homosexual), by sharing contaminated
needless, via infected blood products, and from infected mothers to their newborns.
43
More than 22,000 cases of AIDS have been reported in the United States.44 For
every patient with AIDS, there are probably six or seven with ARC; and for every
patient with ARC, there are probably sixty to seventy seropositive healthy carriers.
45
Of the one to two million people in the United States now infected with the virus,
researchers estimate that five to thirty percent will develop AIDS over the next five
to seven years. 46 The remaining seventy to ninety-five percent, who may be totally
asymptomatic, are assumed equally infectious through sexual or blood-borne
routes.47 Because seventy-three percent of those infected are homosexual/bisexual
men, the virus is most frequently spread through sexual contact.48
38 Calabrese, supra note 30.
39 Id.
40 Comment, supra note 1, at LEXIS 10.
1' Id. at 11
42 Id. (citing Leonard H. Calabrese, D.O., Head of the Department of Rheumatic and Immunologic Disease
Section of Clinical Immunology at the Cleveland Clinic).
43 Weber, supra note 7, at 588.
4 Comment, supra note 1, at LEXIS 11.
45 ld.
4 Weber, supra note 7, at 586-87 (citing Curran, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow, & Dowdle, The Epidemi-
ology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 SCIENCE 1352, 1355 (1985)) (exploring the
possibility that HIV may be present in the Hepatitis B Vaccine).47 Comment, supra note 1, at LExIs 12 (citing Leonard H. Calabrese, D.O., Head of Department of Rheumatic
and Immunologic Diseases Section of Clinical Immunology at the Cleveland Clinic).
18 Weber, supra note 7, at 588.
[Vol. 22:4
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However, this comment will focus on the one percent of AIDS cases associ-
ated with receipt of blood transfusions.49 Transmission via blood transfusions has
been rare considering that three million patients receive blood every year. 50 Another
1% of the AIDS patients have hemophilia, a condition manifested by a deficiency in
factor VIII, a blood clotting mechanism.5 This deficiency is treated with a blood
product made from plasma pools collected from thousands of donors which greatly
increases the risk of acquiring AIDS .52 The period between contact and becoming
seropositive is between six weeks to six months.5 3 Therefore, an infected person may
be asymptomatic, either never tested and totally unaware of the infection or tested
before the incubation period thereby receiving a false negative.
The remainder of this comment will concentrate on the above two percent of
AIDS cases transmitted by blood or blood products. A thorough historical discus-
sion of the blood donor system in the United States, beginning with the discovery of
the AIDS epidemic, assists the courts in the decisions of subsequent litigation and
may be helpful in our subsequent analysis of civil and criminal liabilities.
PART II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BLOOD DONATION
Although the first cases of AIDS were diagnosed in June-July of 1981, it was




This raised the possibility that AIDS might be blood borne.55 On July 27, 1982, a
meeting of the Public Health Service Committee on opportunistic infection in
patients with hemophilia included representatives from the following: the Center for
Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the American Association of Blood Bankers, the National Gay Task Force and
other blood banking and public health organizations.5 6 Although no recommenda-
tions were developed, its report indicated that AIDS may be transmitted via blood
products.57 In December of 1982 the Center for Disease Control reported a case of
"Possible Transfusion-Associated AIDS" in California. 58 Because the case in-
volved an infant who received blood platelets, and did not fit any of the previously
noted high risk categories, the possibility of transmission by transfusion became the
49 Id. (citing Center on Disease Control, Up-date: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United
States, 32 MMWR 465 (1983)).
50 Weber, supra note 7, at 588.
51 Id.
52 Id. (citing Council on Scientific Affairs, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-Commentary, 252
J.A.M.A. 2037 (1984)). This is accomplished by the exchange of body fluids, such as semen and blood.
13 Weber, supra note 7, at 586.
14 Comment, supra note 29, at LEXIS 13.
5 5 Id.
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focus of the medical community's attention.59 In January, 1983, a work group to
identify opportunities for prevention of AIDS was convened, consisting of a similar
representation as the hemophiliac meeting in 1982.60 As of the meeting date, January
4, 1983, there were five reported cases of AIDS among hemophiliacs, one related to
blood transfusion, and four related to blood products.61 At the meeting, it was the
consensus that individuals who were members of "high risk" groups should not
donate blood; however, no method was developed to achieve this end. The work
group discussed the possibility of screening out male homosexuals but rejected that
procedure as too "intrusive, unethical, and too prone to prejudice or persecution.' '62
The Public Health committee resolved to issue recommendations as soon as
possible. 6
3
On January 13, 1983, the ARC, the American Association of Blood Bankers,
and the Council of Community Blood Banks issued a "Joint Statement on AIDS
Related to Transfusion. "6' The "joint statement" suggested that donor screening
should include questions designed to elicit a history of night sweating, unexplained
fever, unexpected weight loss, lymphadenopathy, or Kaposi's sarcoma. 65 The
statement did not advise routine laboratory screening and explicitly stated "direct
or indirect questions about a donor's sexual preference are inappropriate. ' 66 In
March 1983, both the Public Health Service Committee and the Bureau of Biologics
of the Food and Drug Administration issued their recommendations for donor
screening. 67 Both recommended that before donating blood, donors be given pam-
phlets describing high risk groups and be given the option to self-screen and to
voluntarily refuse to donate with no explanation.
68
It was not until 1984 that the medical community finally concluded that AIDS
was transmissible by blood. 69 In April 1984, scientists identified the virus HIV as
the cause of AIDS.70 By May 1985, a test was developed to screen for the antibodies
sensitive to the HIV virus.71 The Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA)
has proven 98.6% effective in detecting exposure to AIDS .72 The test does not detect
the virus directly, but rather detects a natural protein of our immune system created
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1051-52.







69 Kirkendall v. Harbor Insurance Company, 698 F. Supp. 768, (LExIs 12216) (W.D.A.K. Oct. 21, 1988) (cit-
ing 23 TRANSFUSION, March-April 1983 at 87-88); Kozup v. Georgetown Univeristy, 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052
(1987).
70 Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1052-53.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
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to attack the virus.7 3 The ELISA is a highly sensitive test for detecting the antibody,
but because it lacks total specificity it may give a false-positive.74 However, when
coupled with a second test, the Western Blot Analysis, the rate of detection for
exposure to AIDS rises to 100%.15
A patient who receives a blood product containing the HIV virus will likely
develop AIDS.7 6 As of April 6, 1987,33,644 Americans have developed AIDS from
blood transfusions. 77 In virtually all such cases the transfusion occurred before
March 15, 1985, when the FDA licensed companies to sell ELISA and testing was
susbequently completed on all donated blood.7"
A negative result on these tests cannot absolutely rule out infection.7 9 Some
authorities feel the test itself may not be sufficiently sensitive to detect all instances
of HIV infection. s Medical experts know that some strains of the virus are different
from others and that the ELISA is not responsive to all strains.,' Additionally, there
is an interval of infectivity following exposure to the virus before a sufficient number
of antibodies develop to result in a positive reaction on the ELISA or Western Blot. s2
Failure to detect individuals occurs in the following situations: (1) during the period
of early infection because it takes from two to twenty-six weeks to develop the
antibody after infection, (2) in those very few infected individuals who seem inca-
pable of developing antibodies that are readily detectable by currently used methods,
and (3) late in the course of infection, usually an individual with severe AIDS,
because it is common that individuals stop making detectable specific antibodies. s3
This "window" of infectivity without seroactivity may become a crucial factor in
allowing dissemination of the virus. 4
Despite warnings to alert blood donors as to symptoms and to possible
exposure to contact with a high risk population, there are times when ELISA reads
7 Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1053.
7' Id. (citing Curran, Lawrence Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Associated with Transfusions, 310
NEW ENG. J. MED. 69,70 (1984); Aids Transmission via Transfusion Therapy, 8368 THE LANCET 102 (Jan. 14,
1984) cited in Hospital and Blood Bank Liability to Patients Who Contract AIDS Through Blood
Transfusions, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875, 878).
" Kozup, 663 F. Sup. at 1053 (citing Fischinger, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: The Causative
Agent and the Evolving Perspective, 9 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN CANCER 4 (1985); Perspective on the Future of
AIDS, 253 J. A.M.A. 247 (L985), cited in 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875, 879)).
76 Id.
77 Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1054 (citing Herman, AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 U. COLO.
L. REv. 77; 34 MMWR 1 (1985)).
11 Calabrese, supra note 35, at 7-8.79 Id.
8o Collins, Blood Products and Tissues, LAW AND LITIGATION REPORTER 220, 230 (1987).
81 Id.
11 Id. (citing Salahuddin, Groopman, Markham, Sarngaharaa, Redfield, McLane, Weise, Sliski, & Gallo,
HTLVIII in Symptom-Free Seronegative Persons, THE LANCET 1418 (Dec. 22-29, 1984)); National Academy
of Sciences, Confronting AIDS 309-313 (National Academy Press 1986)).
83 Calabrese, supra note 35, at 10.
8 Collins, supra note 68.
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a false negative and the virus is transmitted to an innocent blood recipient.8 In light
of this information concerning AIDS and the evolution of blood donation proce-
dures, the following section explores the realm of civil or criminal liabilities for
blood donors who are infected with the AIDS virus.
Although the incidence of contamination and transmission through blood
transfusions are small in number in comparison to sexual transmission, there is a
great difference in these groups. The blood recipients are a totally involuntary and
innocent population. They are people who are injured in accidents, require surgery,
newborn babies, pregnant mothers, or hemophiliacs. This list reflects only a small
portion of the population affected, but they all have one thing in common, blind
ignorance to the fact that instead of a gift of life, someone has chosen for them, a
death sentence.
Early means of protection for recipients of blood products were education and
self-monitoring.86 However, education has basically been proven ineffective in de-
terring unacceptable behavior.87 When such measures prove ineffective, society
chooses other alternatives, such as civil or criminal liabilities.
PART III
CIVIL LIABILIrrIES
Tort law is the mechanism this society uses to discourage individuals from
subjecting others to unreasonable risk and to provide a measure of compensation to
those who have been injured by unreasonably risky behavior.88 Americans can
expect the AIDS epidemic to produce a staggering array of tort litigation.8 9 The
transmission of the virus through blood products represents one area where such
action is likely to occur.90 Despite the small number, recipients of HIV contaminated
blood are likely to represent a disproportionately high percentage of AIDS-related
torts because they are immune from social disgrace once the cause of their infection
becomes public, and because hospitals and blood banks have "deep pockets." 9'
Although some lawsuits have been filed, the law is only now beginning to evolve in
this area. 92
Historically, a plaintiff's causes of action for the transmission of infectious
85 Calabrese, supra note 30, at 10.
86 Cleary, Education and the Prevention of AIDS, 16:3-4 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 267, 270 (1988).
87 Id.
1 Herman, Torts: Private Lawsuits About AIDS, AIDS and the Law 153 (1987).
89 Id.
9 Id.
9 11 d. at 167.
92 Kelly, Negligence and Intentional Torts: Liability of Individualfor Transmission of HIV, MEDICO-LEGAL
LIBRARY 149-150 (citing McPherson M. Hudson Estate Sues: Alleged Former Lover Says Actor Hid AIDS,
WASH POST Bi (Nov. 13, 1985, case decided for plaintiff week of 2-14-89)).
[Vol. 22:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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diseases have varied, but usually have included negligence, battery, and fraud or
misrepresentation. 93 Courts have found defendants liable for damages stemming
from the transmission of the infectious diseases of tuberculosis,94 typhoid fever,95
whooping cough,9 6 small pox,97 venereal disease 98, and genital herpes. 99 The prin-
ciples applied in these cases would likely apply to a case of HIV transmission.'0° A
California appellate court, upholding a cause of action for tortious transmission of
genital herpes, recognized the similarity to AIDS.'' Hopefully, making wrongdoers
liable in tort will discourage behavior that puts others at risk. 02
Most torts have a common structure. A plaintiff must show that the defendant
owed him a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, the breach caused
the plaintiff injury, and that the injury caused losses compensable by money,
damages. 103 Keeping these elements in mind, this comment will next analyze all the
probable causes of action against one who donates blood despite having AIDS.
Battery
A common law action in battery consists of an: (1) intentional (2) offensive or
harmful (3) unprivileged contact (4) with another person."° The requisite intent for
Battery is not necessarily intent to harm but that the consequences are "substantially
certain" to follow from the act. Intent may be inferred from acts which are
''substantially certain" to cause infection.0 6 From that we must presume that the
defendent knew he was infected. A cause of action in battery requires the defendant
to know he was infected; that he should have known is not sufficient. 07 Thus, in an
action for battery, it may be necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the contact
at issue occurred after the defendant was diagnosed with AIDS, ARC, or at least
tested positive for the HIV virus. 08 Because a person may be infected with the HIV
93 Id.
9 Id. (citing Earle v. Kuklo, 26 No. Super 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953).
91 Kelly, supra note 77 (citing Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wisc. 4332, 69 N.W. 67 (1896)).
9 Kelly, supra note 77 (citing Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1884)).
7 Kelly, supra note 77 (citing Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 23 N.W. 638 (1885); Franklin J. Botcher,
144 Mo. App. 660, 129 S.W. 428 (1910); Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910)).
91 Kelly, supra at note 77. (citing State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102a 63 (1917); Crewell v. Crewell, 180
N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920)).
99 Kelly, supra at note 77 (citing Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Col. App. 3d 992 (1984); Long v. Adams, 175
Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E. 201 (1985); Reinke v. Lenchitz, No. A86001967, LExIs 1915 (Ohio App. May 18,
1988)).
"o Kelly, supra note 77 (citing Annotation: Tort Liability for Infliction of Venereal Disease, 40 A.L.R. 4th
1083-1102 (1985)).
"' Kelly, supra note 77 (citing Kathleen K. v. Robert B., Cal. App.3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984)).
'02 Hermann, supra note 73, at 154.
103 ld.
I'4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13-18 (1965).
101 Hermann, supra note 88, at 154.
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virus, and may be contagious, but not ill, he may not have the degree of knowledge
required to infer the intent to harm.'0 9
Because a blood donor has no direct contact with a recipient, it may be difficult
to establish the element of contact in litigation for transmission through blood
donation." 0
Negligence
"To be stricken with disease through another's negligence is in legal contem-
plation as it often is in the seriousness of consequences, no different from being
struck with an automobile through another's negligence." "' An infected person not
only has an obligation to disclose the disease, but also to provide full and accurate
information, even if he may be honestly mistaken about the facts." 2 The infected
person has a duty to refrain from donating blood. The standard to be applied in such
a case is whether the defendant "knew or should have known" of his infection. 13
An argument will undoubtedly be put forth that any person in a high risk group has
an affirmative duty to discover exposure to AIDS before engaging in any activity
which may expose another."14 It may be easier to prove negligence than battery
against a blood donor who transmitted the HIV virus because of the lower standard
of evidence needed to establish that the defendant" should have known," rather than
that he "knew," of the infection.
Fraud or Deceit
.The elements of a tort in misrepresentation or fraud include: (1) a false
representation, (2) knowledge or belief in the falsity, (3) intention to induce reliance,
(4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damage from the reliance." 5 Courts have been
reluctant to extend misrepresentation beyond it's original commercial context. 116
Because a more appropriate basis for liability exists in battery and negligence, it is
likely they will be the choices for causes of action rather than fraud and misrepre-
sentation.' 17
Third Party Action
A plaintiff's negligence action against a defendant for infecting a third person
109Id.
110Id.
111 Id. at 152 (citing Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 328 Pa. 97, 105, 195, A. 110, 114 (1937)).
112 Kelly, supra note 77, at 153.
113 Id.
14 Id.
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
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who then infected the plaintiff may be called a "third party action." "8 One lawsuit
so classified was filed by a husband against his wife's lover because he, the husband,
had contacted genital herpes. 11 Such actions may be brought to avoid interspousal
immunity, to reach deeper pockets, or to assert the rights of a child against the third
party who had infected the mother. 2 0
Infliction of Mental Distress
An HIV positive plaintiff, even without a diagnosis or current symptoms may
have a cause of action for "fear of developing AIDS" or for future medical
expenses. 2 ' Any case law in this area has arisen regarding toxic substances such as
asbestos and radiation.'22 Courts have permitted such actions even if the plaintiff
could not prove he would in any probability contract the disease as long as the fear
was "reasonable." 1 23 Although the common law of torts provides the victim of con-
taminated blood or blood products some redress, further problems have arisen
regarding such litigation in addition to the problems discussed in meeting the
necessary elements of each cause of action.
If a plaintiff tests positive for HIV, but does not manifest any disease
symptoms, he may not be able to prove economic damages or that he will develop
symptoms. 124 Also, during the course of litigation, it is likely that the plaintiff's
identity and condition will be publicized. Such publicity can result in such social
problems as exclusion from housing, employment, and other discrimination. 125
Those thinking of bringing suit will also need to evaluate the chances of collecting
awarded damages. A potential defendant who has AIDS, or who may develop the
condition may have limited financial resources, or medical expenses which may
deplete his assets. 26 Those facts will minimize his ability to pay damages. 127 Ad-
ditionally, defendants probably will not be covered by insurance for such a liability
as the negligent transmission of an infectious disease. 128 Due to lack of insurance,
plaintiffs may opt to by-pass an individual blood donor in favor of a suit against
"deeper pockets."' 129 There is also the factor of the long latency period between the
exposure to the virus and the manifestation of the disease to consider. For that reason
it may be difficult to prove proximate cause because of the difficulty in finding the
18 Id.
"I Id. (citing Jaffee v. Cills, No. 84C, 02131 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1984)).
120 Kelly, supra note 77, at 154.
'Id. at 156 (citing Dworkin, Fear ofDisease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's
Box?, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (1984)).
122 Id.
123 Kelly, supra note 77, at 156 (citing In re Moorevich, 354 Pa. Super. 520, 572, A. at 661 (1986)).
124 Kelly, supra note 77, at 158.
25 Kelly, supra note 77, at 157.
126 Hermann, Torts: Private Lawsuits About AIDS, AIDS AND THE LAW 155 (1987).
127 Id.
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defendant and proving he was the source. 3°
The long latency period and nature of the disease also make it probable that a
defendant will be deceased by the time suit is brought. Due to the backlog in court
dockets, the plaintiff may also be deceased. Estate suits typically do not arouse juries
to award settlements, large or small."'3 Long latency, necessarily involved in these
suits, raises statutes of limitation issues. If the statute begins to run upon discovery
of being HIV antibody positive, the case may be tried before the plaintiff develops
AIDS. This releases a damages issue.'32 However, if plaintiff assumes the statute
of limitations does not run until he or she develops AIDS, he may find he has missed
a filing deadline which may be triggered by knowledge of the positive HIV antibody
test.'33
Exposure to HIV and possible development of AIDS can cause psychological
injury as well as the physical pain, suffering, incapacitation and eventual death due
to the opportunistic infections. As discussed, one recourse for the victim contami-
nated by donated blood or subsequent blood products may be a civil or tort action.
However, while the variety of problems which have been reviewed beset the tort
plaintiff, recognition of tort liability will make it possible for some victims to receive
compensation for their damages.
In conjunction with civil actions, criminal sanctions have evolved for trans-
mission of the virus, primarily in the areas of sexual acts'34 and biting or spitting;'35
a case of criminal sanctions for blood donation has also arisen in California. 3 6 New
law is trying to evolve and additionally, plaintiffs are utilizing such old traditional




A generation ago the principal purpose of the criminal statutes was reforma-
tion of offenders.' 38 Today, that goal seems to have broadened, and now includes
130 Id. at 158.
131 Id.
132 Id.
131 Id. at 158-159 (citing Large v. Bucyrus, Erie Co., 524 F. Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Asbestos
exposure-the limitations period begins to run when the initial injury is sustained). But see Wilson v. Johns
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1988) where plaintiff learned he had mild asbestosis in 1973
but did not learn of mesothelioma until 1978 his cause of action for cancer did not accure until 1978.
'34 Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Jun. 19, 1987, at 3, col. 1,3.
"I Id. See also, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Sept. 2, 1986, 20, col. 4; Los Angeles Daily Journal, Jan. 28,
1988, at 3, col.
136 Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 21, 1987, at 15, col. 3.
231 Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is Being Criminalized, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (Fall 1988).
138 Robinson, Criminal Sanctions and Quarantine, MEDICO-LEGAL LIBRARY 166 (1988).
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penalties intended to act as deterrents and punishments of certain acts. 139 Obstensi-
bly, the purpose of criminal statutes dealing with AIDS includes deterrence and
punishment.'4 ° However, fear of death, disease, and sex are deeply rooted in
American society. 4 ' When the punishment purpose is combined with pre-existing
prejudices towards minorities, homosexuals, and drug users, criminal sanctions
begin to suggest discrimination.'42 However, whatever the purpose, criminal
sanctions for transmission of AIDS are a reality.
In 1987 alone, twenty-nine bills containing criminal sanctions dealing with
AIDS, were introduced in state legislatures. 143 Five states have enacted criminal
statutes aimed at persons who have tested positive for HIV.'44 Twenty-four states
have criminal statutes dealing with those who have been exposed to a sexually
transmitted disease.'45 Although rarely used in the past there is a renewed interest
in these statutes. 46
The new state statutes fall into three general categories as follows:
(1) Statutes mandating disclosure of HIV status,
(2) Statutes prescribing particular activities, and
(3) Statutes enhancing penalties for acts already illegal. 147 The
statutes prescribing certain activity, such as blood donation, are based
on the purposeful, willful or knowing exposure of another to the AIDS
virus. Such statutes have been enacted in Alabama and Idaho.
148
Four major arguments have been raised against any enactment of HIV-specific
criminal sanctions. First, as evidenced by the sodomy statutes, criminal statutes
outlawing private consensual sexual activity are not particularly effective for
deterrences. 149 Second, such statutes have a detrimental and invasive impact on
privacy rights of HIV carriers as well as their partners. 50 Third, in view of the
possibility that morals laws may be selectively enforced to harass persons based on
their sexual orientation, there is concern that such statutes may be selectively
applied. 5' Such selective application could mislead the public into ignoring the
139 Id.
140 Id.
"I' Schechter, supra note 118.
142 Id.
143 Id.
" Robinson, supra note 119.
145 Id.
146 Id.
'41 Schechter, supra note 118, at 7.
148 Id.
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danger an epidemic poses to all people. Fourth, HIV specific statutes pose the same
difficult proof problems as do the traditional criminal law statutes. 152
Of the old statutes, the courts may utilize murder, manslaughter, reckless
endangerment, assault and statutes aimed at the transmission of infectious diseases.
The probable liabilities of an AIDS infected donor will be discussed below.
Murder
Under the Model Penal Code Section 210.2, murder requires a purposeful,
knowing, or reckless state of mind. 53 To act with purpose to transmit HIV, the actor
must believe he or she carries the virus, can transmit it and desire to cause another
person to die because of his behavior. 54 To act knowlingly, the actor must know he
or she carries the virus and that it is "practically certain" that the conduct will cause
death. 5 5 To act recklessly, the actor must "consciously disregard a substantial and
unjustifiable risk. ''1 6 The risk must be a "gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actors situation," "an
extreme indifference to the value of human life.' ' 1 57 These standards would be
difficult to prove in an AIDS donor case.
Manslaughter and Negligent Manslaughter
The states of mind required to prove manslaughter and negligent manslaugh-
ter are less stringent than those for murder, and are more likely to be established in
some donor cases. To commit manslaughter an actor must act "recklessly."'1 58 It
is not necessary to prove "extreme indifference to the value of human life."' 159 The
donor must be shown to have been aware of the substantial risk that he does, or might,
carry the virus and that his conduct may transmit it.' 60 For negligent manslaughter,
the donor must disregard a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" where that lack of
regard "involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor's situation." 161 In defense, the donor would need to prove
that he had only acted negligently or recklessly by failing to: (1) submit to tests to
determine the presence of the HIV status, (2) use precautions when engaged in risky
conduct, or (3) abstain from risky conduct. 62
52 Id. (citing Draft Report of the American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc Committee
on AIDS and the Criminal Justice System, 59 (March 1988).
153 Schechter, supra note 118, at 8.
154 Id.
'55 A.B.A., AIDS, The Legal Issues 24 (1988).
156 Schechter, supra note 118, at 8.
157 Id.
". A.B.A., supra note 131, at 25.
159 Id.
160 Id.
6I Id. at 24. See also Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is Being Criminalized, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (Fall
1988); Robinson, Criminal Sanctions and Quarantine, MEDICO-LEGAL LIBRARY 166 (1988).
162 A.B.A., supra note 131, at 24 (citing Model Penal Code Section 2.02 (2)(b)(i)).
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Even where the requisite state of mind is shown to exist in a cause of action
for murder, manslaughter, or negligent manslaughter, causation may be extremely
difficult to establish.163 Generally, proving the person from whom the deceased
contracted the HIV virus will be difficult.164 A major factor which conpounds the
problem is the delay between exposure and the production of antibodies and death.' 65
Attempted Murder
Although attempted murder presents no causation problem because proof of
death is not required, it does require proof of purposeful or knowing conduct. 166 This
raises all state of mind issues discussed in the murder section above, and therefore,
is not a viable charge.
Reckless Endangerment
Reckless endangerment, like attempted murder, does not present a causation
problem, because no proof of death is required. 167 Reckless endangerment occurs
when a person "recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury."' 168 The plaintiff is not required
to prove that the defendant actually harmed the plaintiff.169 Therefore, reckless
endangerment is a more likely cause of action against a donor.
Assault
Assault requires the actor to attempt to cause bodily injury to another, or cause
bodily injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. 70 Once again with this cause the
state of mind will be difficult to prove.
State's Communicable Disease Statutes
Some states' 7' are utilizing their communicable disease statutes to threaten
those who knowingly transmit the disease. Again the requisite state of mind is for
the actor to know he carries the virus and be practically certain the conduct will cause
death.
Despite the problems inherent in criminal sanctions for the spread of HIV, a
small number of plaintiffs do attempt to litigate. Focal points seem to be in the areas
163 Id.
64 Id. at 25.
165 Id. (citing M.P.C. section 2.02 (2)(c)).
166 Id. at 25-6.
167 Id. at 26.
168 Id. (citing M.P.C. section 210.3)).
169 Id. (citing M.P.C. section 2.02 (2)(d)).
110 Id. at 25.
171 Such states include Minnesota and Texas.
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of prostitution, 72 or spitting by carriers, 73 homosexual bitings,'74 and in one case,
blood donation. 7 5 Such criminal actions raise further issues of mandatory blood
testing,'76 AIDS in the prison system, 77 and privacy.'78 The expertsare skeptical,
based on the cases filed and problems with state of mind and causation, that criminal
sanctions will either deter or have any significant impact on the epidemic problem. 179
They see criminal sanctions as a hysterical response to the fear of a deadly enemy,
the HIV, and an infectious response by society based on moral and social issues, not
on significant considerations. 80 Even if criminal sanctions prove an ineffective
deterrent to transmission of the HIV virus, there are proponents of a closely related
means of control, isolation, confinement or quarantine.'
8
'
Many states 82 already have public health laws which permit authorities to
impose restrictions on contagious disease carriers. Although seldom used, these
laws have remained on the books and are available as a weapon against HIV. 83 The
major problem in the application of these laws arises in the area of constitutionally
guaranteed rights because few states have amended the quarantine laws to afford any
protections prior to imposition. 84 As opposed to other diseases, medical uncertainty
prevents quarantine from being a constitutional alternative for AIDS control.
Physicians cannot determine when an AIDS carrier is infectious and no cure or
vaccine is available. 185 Further, quarantine laws could be easily misused in response
to the moral and social outrage in this country concerning AIDS, and be used in an
arbitrary and overboard manner. 86
Quarantine, like criminal and civil sanctions, presents options to the victim
whether he has been infected by sexual encounter, blood transfusion, blood products,
or transfers from parent to child. However, all three measures present problems
including proof of state of mind and causation, constitutionality, and appropriateness
"I Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, supra note 115.
173 Id.
174 Id.
"I Los Angeles Daily Journal, supra note 117.
76 Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, supra note 115.
171 Joint Committee on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System, AIDS and the Criminal Justice System (October
16, 1987).
M7 Rasmussen v. South Florioda Blood Service, Inc., 500 So.2d 533, 535 (1987).
'79 Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, supra note 134.
180 Id.
"I' Janus, AIDS and the Law: Setting and Evaluating Threshold Standards For Coercive Public Health
Intervention, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 503 (1988). See The Constitutional Rights of Aids Carriers, 99
HARVARD L. REV. 1274 (1986).
812 Such states include Minnesota and Texas. Twenty-four states have Sexually Transmitted Disease Statues;
these states include Delaware, California, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
183 Janus, supra note 181.
84 Boorstin, Litigation Over Intentional AIDS Exposure Growing, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin 3 (Friday,
June 19, 1987).
185 Id.
186 Id. See also Barlow v. The People, #572249 (Super Ct. Calif. 1987); United States v. Kazenbach, 824 F.2d
649 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
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in light of social and ethic norms. Additionally, the particular class of blood donors
are confronted with yet another obstacle to litigation. Public policy favors an on-
going voluntary blood supply; therefore, courts realize the importance of safeguard-
ing the privacy of blood donors.
PART V
DISCOVERY - BLOOD DONOR
In the cases which have been litigated in this country, courts have been
consistent in not permitting disclosure, during discovery, of the name of individual
blood donors whose blood has transmitted the HIV virus. 187 Although the outcome
has been consistent the courts have based their decisions on the constitutional right
to privacy or the public policy of maintaining an on-going blood supply.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, as well as state procedural rules,
clearly indicate that courts have the authority to limit discovery to prevent abuse.
The rules state: "For good cause shown, the court... may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or an undue burden or expense." 188 Therefore, the trial court must balance the
interests and needs of the plaintiff against the harm which may result to both the
defendant and society.' 89
A constitutional right of privacy, regarding disclosure of information, was
first recognized in Whalen v. Roe.190 In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that disclosure of a person's name or address can harm his reputation
if the context of the release associates him with certain activities or characteristics. '9'
The United States Constitution does not specifically mention an inherent right of
privacy, but even absent that explicit text, the United States Supreme Court has es-
tablished that the right exists.' 92 While there are few cases which have explored the
issue in an AIDS setting, the key case concerning this point is Rasmussen v. South
87 Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 533. See Taylor v. West Penn. Hospital, #GD87-0206, slip opinion (Ct. Common
Pleas Allegheny Co., Pa. 1987); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, LEXis 5317 ( 10th Cir. 1988); Belle Bonfills
Memorial Blood Center v. Denver, No. 88SA45 (S.C. Col. 1988); Mason v. Regional Medical Center of
HopkinsCounty, No. 87-0123-0(CS), LExIs 8623 (1988); Krygierv. Airwelding, Inc., 520N.Y. Supp.2d475
(1987)).
88 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26c.
,9 A.B.A., supra note 131, at 21-38. Schachter, Preventive Medicine: AIDS Education for Law Enforce-
ment, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-4 (Fall 1988); Committee Report: Aids and the Criminal Justice System: A
Preliminary Report and Recommendations.
11o Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
191 Id.
,92 A.B.A., supra note 131, at 21-22, See Robinson, Criminal Sanctions and Quarantine, MEDIco LEGAL
LIBRARY 165-175 (1987); Janus, AIDS and the Law: Setting and Evaluating Threshold Standards for
Coercive Public Health Intervention, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 503 (1988).
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Florida Blood Service, Inc. 193
In Rasmussen, the plaintiff, following an automobile accident, received fifty-
one units of blood supplied by the defendant blood bank. 94 The plaintiff subse-
quently contracted AIDS and died. 9 A wrongful death action was filed. The
plaintiff then requested discovery of the donors' names and addresses which was
denied on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.'97 The court specifically
addressed the issue of donor privacy concerning their sexual and medical histories.'98
The court considered the social ostracism associated with the disease and the
consequences of disclosure to non-parties including co-workers, friends, and em-
ployers.
Further, the court stated that the threat posed goes beyond immediate discom-
fort to extremely disruptive or devastating." ° As the district court recognized,
"AIDS is the modem day equivalent of leprosy. AIDS, or suspicion of AIDS, can
lead to discrimination in employment, education, housing, and even medical
treatment." 20° Furthermore, the court addressed society's interest in maintaining a
strong volunteer blood supply.202 Exclusion of blood donors since AIDS as well as
the fear that donating may spread the disease, have already reduced the number of
available donors; no further disincentive is needed.203 Therefore, the final decision
to deny discovery depended on balancing the concern of the plaintiff against the
weight of a constitutional right as well as a societal interest.
Predominantly, subsequent litigation has cited Rasmussen and followed its
lead in protecting the identity of the blood donor.
In Taylor v. West Penn Hospital the plaintiff contracted AIDS following
blood transfusions during open heart surgery. In seeking discovery the court
provided all the general information but refused to disclose the donor name. 25
However, the Pennsylvania court rested its decision solely on non-constitutional
grounds, finding that disclosure of the blood donors' identities would inhibit blood
donation.20 6
193 Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 533.
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201 Id. at 539-540.
203 Id.
204 Taylor v. West Penn Hospital, #GD87-0206, U.S. Dist. LExIS (1988).
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In Doe v. University of Cincinnati, °7 the court overturned the trial court's
grant of disclosure. At the trial court level, emotion was strongly in favor of an AIDS
victim who contracted AIDS during surgery for a malignant brain tumor.20 s The
court granted disclosure, but restricted it to the donor's name, address, and phone
number. 20 9 The court further required that plaintiffs and their counsel not divulge the
identity of the donor, or contact him, or institute any action against him, without the
court's permission. 210  The appellate court found the language in Rasmussen
persuasive.21 ' The court stated that in a suit against a hospital and blood bank, the
plaintiff could proceed with his case without the requested information.
2 12
In Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court for the City and
County of Denver,2 13 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a protective order to bar
discovery of the name and address of a blood donor. In the Kentucky case of Mason
v. Regional Medical Center 14 and in the New York case of Krygier v. Alirlo,215 the
courts again upheld a protective order denying disclosure of donor information.
However, in the Texas case of Tarrant County Hospital v. Hughes 2 16 the court found
"no constitutional right of privacy as well as no possible 'chilling effect' on the part
of health care facilities to obtain a sufficient supply of blood," and discovery was
permitted.217 However, the record indicates that certain stipulations were placed on
the manner and extent of any disclosure. 8 Subsequent to Hughes, a Texas appellate
court in Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center v. Houston219 upheld disclosure of blood
donor information as not violative of the due process rights.
The laws remain unsettled on the disclosure issue. The prevailing view
appears to protect the identity of any blood donor, which insulates the donor from
litigation. The predominant theme of these new cases reflects a concerted effort to
secure society's need for the volunteer blood supply at the cost of denying the AIDS
victim a remedy in tort or criminal law.







213 Belle Bonfills Memorial Blood Center v. Denver, No. 88SA45 (S.C. Col. 1988).
214 Mason v. Regional Medical Center of Hopkins County, No. 87-0123-0(CS), LExis 8623 (1988). (Plaintiff
contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion following a Caesarean section. Donor's name was requested
in a suit based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties).
215 Krygier v. Airweld, 520 N.Y. Supp.2d 475 (1987). (A blood bank was the defendant in a wrongful death
action due to alleged exposure of plaintiff to blood infected with AIDS virus).
216 Tarrant County Hospital v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App. 1987). (Wrongful death action due to
alleged blood transfusions resulting in plantiff becoming infected with AIDS virus).
211 Id. at 680.
2,8 Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 539.
2'9 Gulf Coastal Regional Blood Center v. Houston, No. 2-87-233-CV, WESTLAW (Ct. App. Tex. 1988).
(Wrongful death action in which a bloodcenter sought writ of mandamus to rescind order compelling
identification of blood donors. The court held: (1) there was no paramount right of privacy, and (2) disclosure
would not violate donor's due process rights).
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CONCLUSION
"The period of the Middle Ages had it's Bubonic Plague, the nineteenth
century it's typhoid fever, and the mid-twentieth century the polio epidemic.
Mankind eventually surmounted the problems of those diseases and in time we will
prevail over AIDS.' 2 o However, for today, there is no vaccine and there is no cure.
In the United States, there are now approximately 1.5 million people with
HIV.22' Even if not one single person is newly infected with HIV from this moment
forward, many people will become sick, or die, from a tragic, agonizing disease over
the next five to ten years. 222
Intensive global research is underway and experiments with promising drugs
continue to be reported. Additionally, the medical community has developed the
ELISA and Western Blot Tests for the detection of the virus in blood. The tests have
been successful in decreasing the number of blood-transmitted HIV cases such that
the majority of blood or blood product transmissions occurred before the develop-
ment of those tests. However, there remain those cases where the antibodies in blood
are not detected by present methods, where the donor is in the early infectious stage
and has not developed antibodies, and where a donor late in his disease no longer
produces detectable antibodies.
Just as AIDS research is evolving, so is the law in the area of liabilities in AIDS
cases. Case law is scant, especially in the area of the AIDS infected blood donor. By
analogy to other communicable diseases, the recipient of contaminated blood or
blood products may be able to sue for damages based on civil tort litigation in
battery, negligence, fraud, or deceit, or infliction of mental distress. However,
problems arise in proving the necessary elements of a cause of action, as well as with
damages issues, publicity and procedural issues.
An alternative suit may center on criminal liability. Some states are attempt-
ing to create new laws specifically directed at the HIV problem. However, like the
traditional old statutes, such as murder, manslaughter, reckless endangerment and
assault, the new legislation has inherent problems with the standards required for
culpability. Other states are utilizing their old communicable disease statutes. But
again, the state of mind required for culpability precludes certain actions.
Finally, in an attempt to control the epidemic, states have the option of quar-
antine. However, the old quarantine laws have not been amended to attend to
constitutional protections. In an illness susceptible to discrimination and over-
reaction, the medical uncertainty prevents quarantine from being an alternative
220 Messittee, AIDS: A Judicial Perspective, 72:4 JUDICATURE 205 (1989).
22' Harris, AIDS and the Future, 4:2 ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE 141 (1988).
222 Id.
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method of AIDS control.
Infected blood donors remain virtually immune from civil or criminal liabili-
ties because the courts tend to protect the blood donor's identity. The courts have
approved protective orders denying discovery based on the constitutional right of
privacy and the public policy of maintaining an adequate blood supply.
If the courts continue to uphold those decisions, the AIDS infected blood
donor will be insulated from prosecution. However, litigation is just beginning, and
much will depend on the moral, economic, political, and medical atmosphere in the
future because AIDS is a fear-evoking, opportunistic, deadly disease. In this new,
evolving area of the law, the legal community has a responsibility to follow and guide
the progress of future legislation and case-made law.
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